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  <updated>2026-10-07T07:19:06.359424+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339216</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-339216</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:19:06.362156+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-339216</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339216"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54051</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54051</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:19:06.362189+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; &lt;anything&gt;`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; &amp; | $ ` ` ` ( ) &lt; &gt; { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54051"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qw6v-5fcf-5666</id>
    <title>GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 — Network-AI: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:19:06.362228+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: network-ai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; &lt;anything&gt;`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.</p>
<p>## Root cause</p>
<p>Matching and execution disagree on what a command is. Lines pinned to `40e42d7` (`lib/agent-runtime.ts` is identical to the v5.8.5 tag).</p>
<p>1. `isCommandAllowed` matches the full string, with no tokenizing and no metacharacter check:</p>
<p>https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L248-L260</p>
<p>2. `globMatch` compiles `*` to `.*` and anchors it, so `git *` becomes `^git .*$` and matches `git status; id`:</p>
<p>https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L353-L360</p>
<p>3. `ShellExecutor.execute` only checks `isCommandAllowed`, never `requiresApproval`:</p>
<p>https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L387-L391</p>
<p>4. `spawnCommand` runs the approved string via `/bin/sh -c`, so `;`, `|` and `$(...)` are interpreted by the shell:</p>
<p>https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L427-L43…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qw6v-5fcf-5666"/>
  </entry>
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