https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-13T04:29:13.246791+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329844 EUVD-2026-329844 2026-10-13T04:29:13.249957+00:00 EUVD-2026-329844 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54015 fkie_cve-2026-54015 2026-10-13T04:29:13.249989+00:00

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). This affects /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff, /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version, and /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}. An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj — Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion 2026-10-13T04:29:13.250023+00:00

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

## Summary

Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:

- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt's history snapshots (read). - `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt's snapshot into the caller's prompt, exposing its content (read). - `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt's history entry (delete).

An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.

## Impact

Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.

Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.

## Root Cause…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2701 PYSEC-2026-2701 — Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion 2026-10-13T04:29:13.250117+00:00

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

## Summary

Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:

- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt's history snapshots (read). - `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt's snapshot into the caller's prompt, exposing its content (read). - `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt's history entry (delete).

An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.

## Impact

Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.

Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.

## Root Cause…