Joro is a web exploitation framework. Prior to version 1.1.1, Joro's default proxy mode exposes a local API on 127.0.0.1:9090 that performs no authentication and applies a wildcard CORS policy. Because plugin uploads use the CORS-safelisted multipart/form-data content type, cross-origin JavaScript on any page the operator visits can reach privileged endpoints - including uploading a native plugin and triggering a restart - directly through the operator's browser, with no preflight or credentials. Since plugins execute on load, this yields unauthenticated remote code execution as the operator's user from a single page visit. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.1.

Affected: Go: github.com/BishopFox/joro

# Unauthenticated Cross-Origin Plugin Upload Leads to RCE (Joro ≤ v1.1.0)

**Severity:** Critical **CVSS v3.1:** 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) **Affected versions:** Joro ≤ v1.1.0, proxy mode (default), Linux/macOS **Reporter:** cstover **Date:** 2026-05-27

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## Summary

Joro's default proxy mode (in versions <= 1.1.0) exposes a local API on `127.0.0.1:9090` that performs no authentication and applies a wildcard CORS policy. Because plugin uploads use the CORS-safelisted `multipart/form-data` content type, cross-origin JavaScript on any page the operator visits can reach privileged endpoints - including uploading a native plugin and triggering a restart - directly through the operator's browser, with no preflight or credentials. Since plugins execute on load, this yields unauthenticated remote code execution as the operator's user from a single page visit.

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## Root Cause

Three weaknesses combined into the exploit chain.

**1. No authentication in proxy mode.** `internal/api/server.go` applied `AuthMiddleware` only when `listenerMode` was `true`. In the default proxy mode every API endpoint — including plugin upload and system restart — accepted requests without any token, cookie, or credential.

**2. Permissive CORS with an insufficient protection assumption.** `corsMiddleware` set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` unconditionally on all responses. `SECURITY.md` documented this as an intentional tradeoff on the basis that proxy mode binds to `127.0.0.1`,…