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EUVD-2026-364103

2026-10-05T20:22:59.908609+00:00

EUVD-2026-364103

fkie_cve-2026-53602

2026-10-05T20:22:59.908647+00:00

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.7, two related authorization gaps let a host that should no longer be trusted obtain a fresh, valid Nebula certificate, because nebula-mgmt does not re-evaluate revocation/authorization state at certificate issuance time — only at poll time. Firstly, the blocklist is not enforced at sign / re-enroll time. internal/api/enroll.go:128 calls caMgr.Sign(...) without consulting the blocklist. The blocklist is only checked in the poll path (internal/api/updates.go:57, fingerprintInBlocklist). The blocklist is keyed by certificate fingerprint (internal/store/sqlite.go), so a re-enrollment produces a new fingerprint that is not in the blocklist. Secondly, renewal does not re-validate operator / CA status. Auto-renewal at poll time (internal/api/updates.go:285-319, signHostCert) reads host.Name, host.Groups, host.NebulaIPs from the DB and re-signs without checking whether the owning operator is still active or the CA still valid. DisableOperator (internal/store/sqlite_operators.go) revokes sessions and API keys but does not retire the operator's CAs, and pki/signer.go checks only CA cert time-expiry, not operator/CA status. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.7.

GHSA-339v-266x-79xr — nebula-mesh: Host revocation is not durable - blocked/offboarded hosts can regain a valid certificate

2026-10-05T20:22:59.908692+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh

## Summary

Two related authorization gaps let a host that should no longer be trusted obtain a fresh, valid Nebula certificate, because nebula-mgmt does not re-evaluate revocation/authorization state at certificate *issuance* time — only at poll time.

## 1. Blocklist not enforced at sign / re-enroll time

`internal/api/enroll.go:128` calls `caMgr.Sign(...)` without consulting the blocklist. The blocklist is only checked in the poll path (`internal/api/updates.go:57`, `fingerprintInBlocklist`). The blocklist is keyed by certificate *fingerprint* (`internal/store/sqlite.go`), so a re-enrollment produces a new fingerprint that is not in the blocklist.

`mintEnrollmentTokenForHost` (`internal/api/hosts.go:491`) authorizes the caller via `canAccessHost` but does **not** check the host status. There is no guard preventing a `blocked` host from transitioning back to `enrolled` (`internal/store/sqlite.go`, `enrollHostInTx` updates status unconditionally).

**Impact:** A host that an operator has blocked can be silently un-blocked by issuing a new enrollment token and re-enrolling — it receives a fresh certificate (new fingerprint) that passes all subsequent poll-time blocklist checks. Revocation is therefore not durable. Requires an operator action (minting a re-enroll token), so this is an integrity/operational-revocation failure rather than an unauthenticated bypass.

## 2. Renewal does not re-validate operator / CA status

Auto-renewal at poll time (`internal/api/updates.go:285…