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  <updated>2026-10-05T13:52:37.585472+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342439</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-342439</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T13:52:37.632815+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-342439</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342439"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52839</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-52839</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T13:52:37.632851+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 correctly filter provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session. A normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52839"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w8xc-8g92-v77h</id>
    <title>GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h — Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T13:52:37.632889+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: alextselegidis/easyappointments</p>
<p>## Summary
 
Easy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.
 
A normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.
 
---
 
## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow
 
### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation
The `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:
 
```php
// Appointments.php
if ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {
    foreach ($appointments as $index =&gt; $appointment) {
        if ((int) $appointment['id_users_provider'] !== (int) $user_id) {
            unset($appointments[$index]);
        }
    }
}
```
 
### Step 2 — store() only checks generic add permission
The store endpoint checks only whether the caller can add appointments in general — no provider…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w8xc-8g92-v77h"/>
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