<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-05T19:29:53.205832+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342440</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-342440</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T19:29:53.255252+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-342440</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-342440"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52837</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-52837</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T19:29:53.255289+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions up to and including 1.5.2, the booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52837"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8</id>
    <title>GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8 — Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T19:29:53.255329+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: alextselegidis/easyappointments</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.</p>
<p>Verified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>### Root cause</p>
<p>`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is exposed for no functional reason.</p>
<p>```php
// application/controllers/Booking.php (v1.5.2)
$appointment_hash = html_vars('appointment_hash');         // line 184
if (!empty($appointment_hash)) {
    $manage_mode = true;
    $results = $this-&gt;appointments_model-&gt;get(['hash' =&gt; $appointment_hash]);
    //…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
