<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:50.370759+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-328552</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-328552</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:50.426441+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-328552</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-328552"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50200</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-50200</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:50.426485+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. In Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint prior to version 4.2.0 and Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore prior to version 3.4.0, the `Sanitizer` component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (`password`, `secret`, `key`, `token`, `.*credentials.*`, `vcap_services`) does not cover the standard .NET pattern `ConnectionStrings:&lt;name&gt;` or Steeltoe Connectors' `Steeltoe:Client:&lt;type&gt;:Default:ConnectionString`. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded `Password=` and `user:pass@host` segments are returned verbatim in `/actuator/env` responses. Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint 4.2.0 and Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore 3.4.0 patch the issue. If an immediate upgrade is not possible: On the standard path, remove `env` from the actuator exposure list; add `.*connectionstring.*` to `KeysToSanitize` as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths; and/or require authorization on actuator endpoints.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50200"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q62h-354g-5r85</id>
    <title>GHSA-q62h-354g-5r85 — Steeltoe's env sanitizer misses connection strings — leaks embedded DB passwords</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:50.426528+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint, NuGet: Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The `Sanitizer` component in the Environment actuator redacts configuration values by matching the configuration key name against a suffix list. The default list (`password`, `secret`, `key`, `token`, `.*credentials.*`, `vcap_services`) does not cover the standard .NET pattern `ConnectionStrings:&lt;name&gt;` or Steeltoe Connectors' `Steeltoe:Client:&lt;type&gt;:Default:ConnectionString`. There is no value-based scrubbing, so full connection string values including embedded `Password=` and `user:pass@host` segments are returned verbatim in `/actuator/env` responses.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Any caller who can reach `/actuator/env` can receive connection strings containing plaintext credentials. Those credentials enable direct connection to the backing database, bypassing the application tier.</p>
<p>### Affected configuration</p>
<p>- Application configuration contains credentials in `ConnectionStrings:*` or `*:ConnectionString` keys.
- On standard deployments: `env` is added to `Management:Endpoints:Actuator:Exposure:Include`. This is not the default.
- On Cloud Foundry: the `/cloudfoundryapplication/env` path is accessible to any authenticated CF user with `read_basic_data` permissions (Space Auditor and above) regardless of the exposure configuration.</p>
<p>### Mitigations</p>
<p>If an immediate upgrade is not possible:</p>
<p>- On the standard path, remove `env` from the actuator exposure list.
- Add `.*connectionstring.*` to `KeysToSanitize` as a defense-in-depth measure for both paths.
- Require authorizatio…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q62h-354g-5r85"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
