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EUVD-2026-328611

2026-10-06T22:05:18.063889+00:00

EUVD-2026-328611

fkie_cve-2026-50194

2026-10-06T22:05:18.063926+00:00

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. When Steeltoe management endpoints versions 3.2.2 through 3.3.0 and 4.1.0 are configured to listen on an alternate port (`Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the `Host` HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port. Versions 3.4.0 and 4.2.0 patch the issue. If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible, add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (`RequireAuthorization`) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation and/or configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the `Host` header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.

GHSA-58f6-6rj2-3v8r — Steeltoe vulnerable to management-port isolation bypass via spoofed Host header

2026-10-06T22:05:18.063962+00:00

Affected: NuGet: Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint, NuGet: Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore

### Summary

When Steeltoe management endpoints are configured to listen on an alternate port (`Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the `Host` HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port.

### Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can reach every actuator endpoint using a specially crafted HTTP request.

### Affected configuration

- The application's public port is accessible over from the network. - `Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured to a value different from the application's main listener port. - The request scheme matches `Management:Endpoints:SslEnabled`. For example, `http` when `SslEnabled` is `false` (the default), or `https` when `SslEnabled` is `true`.

### Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:

- Add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (`RequireAuthorization`) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation. - Configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the `Host` header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.