SurrealDB is a scalable, distributed, collaborative, document-graph database for the realtime web. Prior to 3.1.0, Document::purge_edges in surrealdb/core/src/doc/delete.rs automatically removed graph edge records with permissions disabled through opt.clone().with_perms(false) when a connected node was deleted, bypassing the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete and PERMISSIONS FOR select clauses. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.

Affected: crates.io: surrealdb

In SurrealDB, records can be connected as a graph: a `RELATE` statement creates an edge record between two node records. If either endpoint node is deleted, SurrealDB automatically removes the edge row to keep the graph consistent.

A user with permission to delete a node could also delete the edges connected to that node, even when the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause should have stopped them.

The automatic edge removal (`Document::purge_edges`) ran with permissions disabled (`opt.clone().with_perms(false)`), so the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` and `PERMISSIONS FOR select` clauses were never consulted. The removal step could also observe edge state that the edge's SELECT clause should have hidden.

### Impact

What an attacker **can** do:

- Delete any edge connected to a node they can delete, regardless of the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause. - Observe edge contents that `PERMISSIONS FOR select` should have hidden, as a side effect of the same edge-removal step.

What it **can't** do:

- Delete nodes on tables they do not hold `DELETE` on (the edge removal only runs from an authorised node delete). - Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. - Escalate to root or operator-level privileges.

### Patches

`Document::purge_edges` now propagates the caller's permission context into the edge removal. Each connected edge `DELETE` is evaluated against the edge table's `PERMISSIONS FOR delete` clause, matching a direct `DELETE`.

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