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EUVD-2026-328937

2026-10-07T13:14:33.624413+00:00

EUVD-2026-328937

fkie_cve-2026-49454

2026-10-07T13:14:33.624458+00:00

Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.

GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 — Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass

2026-10-07T13:14:33.624500+00:00

Affected: Hex: relyra

## Summary

Relyra `1.0.0` and `1.1.0` accept forged SAML signatures because `SignatureValue` was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result.

## Details

In `1.0.0` and `1.1.0`, the XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete. `:public_key.verify` over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized `SignedInfo` was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, `DigestValue` was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and `canonicalize/2` remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes.

## Impact

A forged `SignatureValue` carrying an attacker-controlled `NameID` can be accepted as `{:ok}`. Any relying-party application using Relyra `1.0.0` or `1.1.0` can be logged into as an arbitrary user if it trusts the affected response path.

## Patches

Relyra `1.2.0` closes the gap with real exclusive-C14N canonicalization, `:public_key.verify` against the configured IdP certificate's public key, and a constant-time `DigestValue` recompute/compare bound to the exact consumed node on both `verify/4` and `verify_metadata_root/4`.

## Workarounds

There is no safe configuration of `1.0.0` or `1.1.0`. Upgrade to `1.2.0` or later.

## Resources

- Fix commit `2e45689` (wire real XMLDSig crypto into the candidate arm) - Fix commit `8910200` (close metadata t…