https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-07T03:55:23.934355+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329656 EUVD-2026-329656 2026-10-07T03:55:23.996308+00:00 EUVD-2026-329656 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49406 fkie_cve-2026-49406 2026-10-07T03:55:23.996345+00:00

Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.7.12, when Deno was run in BYONM mode (nodeModulesDir: "manual"), the module resolver did not validate that a package's resolved entrypoint stayed within its node_modules/<pkg>/ directory. A malicious package.json whose main field contained .. segments was able to resolve to an arbitrary path on disk, and the resolver then read that file without consulting the --allow-read allowlist. This let a require("evil-pkg") call return the contents of a file that a direct Deno.readTextFileSync(...) call would have been blocked from reading. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.12.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-968w-xfqw-vp9q GHSA-968w-xfqw-vp9q — Deno: BYONM module resolution allows `package.json` main path traversal to bypass `--allow-read` restrictions 2026-10-07T03:55:23.996381+00:00

Affected: crates.io: deno

## Summary

When Deno was run in BYONM mode (`nodeModulesDir: "manual"`), the module resolver did not validate that a package's resolved entrypoint stayed within its `node_modules/<pkg>/` directory. A malicious `package.json` whose `main` field contained `..` segments was able to resolve to an arbitrary path on disk, and the resolver then read that file without consulting the `--allow-read` allowlist. This let a `require("evil-pkg")` call return the contents of a file that a direct `Deno.readTextFileSync(...)` call would have been blocked from reading.

## Details

In BYONM mode, Deno resolved npm packages directly from a user-managed `node_modules` tree. Resolution of `require("pkg")` proceeded by reading `pkg/package.json`, taking the `main` field, joining it to the package directory, and loading the result as a module.

The path joined from `main` was not constrained to the package root. A `package.json` such as:

```json { "main": "../../../secret.json" } ```

resolved to `node_modules/pkg/../../../secret.json`, escaping `node_modules` entirely. The BYONM permission check accepted any path that contained a `node_modules` component and did not reject `..` traversal, so the resolved path was loaded without a read-permission check.

Because resolution loaded JSON entrypoints by parsing their contents and returning them through `require`, this exposed the contents of arbitrary `.json` files reachable by the OS user to the requiring code, even when `--allow-read` had been nar…