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EUVD-2026-329010

2026-10-06T06:15:24.544641+00:00

EUVD-2026-329010

fkie_cve-2026-49339

2026-10-06T06:15:24.544693+00:00

gonic is a music streaming server / free-software subsonic server API implementation. The maintainer's fix in commit `6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410` added an ownership check based on `playlist.UserID`. However, `playlist.UserID` is derived from the first path segment of the attacker-controlled playlist ID, with no path containment on the resolved file path. Any authenticated Subsonic user can therefore bypass the ownership check and read any other user's playlist, delete any other user's playlist, and probe arbitrary file paths on the host for existence/readability. This is a bypass of the boundary the `6dd71e6` fix is trying to enforce; it is closely related to the original GONIC-1 IDOR but uses a different primitive (path traversal in the `id` parameter rather than direct cross-user access). Commit 0824bed88f6bbc490ba28bf09d28e5dfeb07b445 in version 0.21.0 fixes the issue.

GHSA-2fp4-5v5c-4448 — gonic: Path Traversal in playlist `id` bypasses ownership check, enabling any user to read/delete other users' playlists

2026-10-06T06:15:24.544770+00:00

Affected: Go: go.senan.xyz/gonic

## Summary

The maintainer's recent fix in [`6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410`](https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/commit/6dd71e6) (`fix(subsonic): enforce playlist ownership on getPlaylist/deletePlaylist`) added an ownership check based on `playlist.UserID`. However, `playlist.UserID` is derived from the *first path segment* of the attacker-controlled playlist ID, with no path containment on the resolved file path.

**Any authenticated Subsonic user** can therefore bypass the ownership check and:

1. **Read any other user's playlist** (name, comment, IsPublic flag, song list) by crafting a base64-encoded playlist ID whose first segment matches their own user ID, followed by `..` traversal segments pointing into another user's playlist directory. 2. **Delete any other user's playlist** (including admin's curated playlists) by the same trick against `deletePlaylist`. 3. **Probe arbitrary file paths on the host** for existence/readability.

This is a bypass of the boundary the 6dd71e6 fix is trying to enforce; it is closely related to the original GONIC-1 IDOR but uses a different primitive (path traversal in the `id` parameter rather than direct cross-user access).

## Root cause

`server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go::playlistIDDecode` performs raw base64 decode of the `id` parameter and passes the byte string straight to `playlistStore.Read/Delete`:

```go func playlistIDDecode(id specid.ID) string { path, _ := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(id.StringValue)…