SSH.NET is a Secure Shell (SSH) library for .NET. In 2025.1.0 and earlier, ScpClient.Download(string directoryName, DirectoryInfo directoryInfo) trusts file and directory names returned by a remote SCP server and combines them with the requested local directory without containment validation, allowing a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle server to use ../ sequences or absolute paths to create or overwrite files anywhere writable by the client process. This issue is fixed in version 2026.0.0.

Affected: NuGet: SSH.NET

## Summary

`ScpClient.Download(string directoryName, DirectoryInfo directoryInfo)` writes files and directories using names returned by the remote SCP server during recursive downloads, with no validation that the resulting path stays inside the requested local directory. A malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle SCP server can return names containing `../` sequences (or absolute paths), causing the client to create directories and write/overwrite files anywhere the client process has access. This is similar to OpenSSH [CVE-2019-6111](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jr78-hfw4-xp7g), but with directory traversal capability.

## Impact

A malicious/compromised/MITM SCP server can create or write files outside the intended download directory, anywhere the client process can write. Overwriting files such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, shell rc files, cron entries, or application binaries/config can lead to persistence, privilege escalation, or remote code execution on the client host. Requires the victim to perform a directory download from the attacker-controlled server.

## Remediation

The fixed release ensures that remotely-supplied file and directory names are valid local names such that the constructed local path is contained within the given local directory, and throws `ScpException` when an invalid name is detected.

[600be0de543765995a189b5d7cd4efac5007f3ce](https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/commit/600be0de543765995a189b5d7cd4efac5007f3ce)