Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-tesla tesla allows a denial of service via decompression bomb in HTTP response bodies.

When Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression is included in a Tesla middleware pipeline, HTTP response bodies are decompressed eagerly with no size limit. The decompress_body/2 function in lib/tesla/middleware/compression.ex passes the entire response body to :zlib.gunzip/1 or :zlib.unzip/1 without any cap on the output size. Additionally, compression_algorithms/1 splits the content-encoding header on commas and decompress_body/2 recurses once per token, applying a decompression pass on each iteration. A server advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip causes four recursive decompression passes, yielding exponential amplification: each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a payload of a few hundred bytes on the wire inflates to gigabytes of BEAM heap, exhausting memory and crashing or freezing the calling process.

This issue affects tesla: from 0.6.0 before 1.18.3.

Affected: Hex: tesla

### Summary

Any Tesla client pipeline that includes `Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse` or `Tesla.Middleware.Compression` eagerly decompresses HTTP response bodies with no size limit. A server under attacker control (or reached via a redirect) can return a tiny gzip-encoded payload that expands into gigabytes of BEAM heap, crashing or freezing the calling process. Stacking multiple `content-encoding` tokens multiplies the amplification exponentially.

### Details

`decompress_body/2` in `lib/tesla/middleware/compression.ex` passes the full response body to `:zlib.gunzip/1` or `:zlib.unzip/1` with no cap on output size. The list of codec tokens comes from splitting the `content-encoding` header on commas, and `decompress_body/2` recurses once per token. A response advertising `content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip` triggers four recursive decompression passes. Each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a 284-byte wire payload with four layers inflates to approximately 1 GB at the innermost pass, all materialised as a single binary in the caller's heap.

### PoC

1. Serve an HTTP response with `content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip` where the body is a 1 GB block of zeros compressed through four successive gzip passes. 2. Send that response to a Tesla client whose pipeline includes `Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse`. 3. `decompress_body/2` recurses four times without any size check, materialising ~1 GB in the calling process's heap. 4. Repeated or suffi…