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  <updated>2026-10-06T20:16:26.350872+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329264</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-329264</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T20:16:26.413870+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-329264</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329264"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48502</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-48502</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T20:16:26.413912+00:00</updated>
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        <p>MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime() can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed tokenSize includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a stackalloc operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes. A very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException, terminating the host process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48502"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-382j-8mxh-c7x2</id>
    <title>GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2 — MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overfl…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T20:16:26.413950+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: MessagePack</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime()` can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed `tokenSize` includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a `stackalloc` operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.</p>
<p>A very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`, terminating the host process.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Applications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing `DateTime` values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.</p>
<p>`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` and `MaximumObjectGraphDepth` do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.</p>
<p>An attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.</p>
<p>## Affected components</p>
<p>- Package: `MessagePack`
- API: `MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime`
- Data types: `DateTime` and formatte…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-382j-8mxh-c7x2"/>
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