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  <updated>2026-10-05T23:54:00.495157+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326678</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-326678</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T23:54:00.562429+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-326678</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326678"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48110</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-48110</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T23:54:00.562520+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp; server library. From version 0.34.0 to before version 0.61.0, several russh client and server message handlers decoded attacker-controlled SSH strings, name-lists, and byte fields into owned allocations before applying field-specific bounds. A remote SSH peer could send oversized, high-fanout, or malformed length-prefixed fields and make the library allocate, attempt to allocate, or split data before rejecting input that should have been rejected earlier. This issue has been patched in version 0.61.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48110"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r3c-5hpg-58qr</id>
    <title>GHSA-4r3c-5hpg-58qr — Russh SSH message fields were decoded through allocation-first parsers before field-specific bounds</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T23:54:00.562575+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: russh</p>
<p># SSH message fields were decoded through allocation-first parsers before field-specific bounds</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Several `russh` client and server message handlers decoded attacker-controlled SSH strings, name-lists, and byte fields into owned allocations before applying field-specific bounds. A remote SSH peer could send oversized, high-fanout, or malformed length-prefixed fields and make the library allocate, attempt to allocate, or split data before rejecting input that should have been rejected earlier.</p>
<p>### Affected Versions</p>
<p>Oldest verified exploitable stable release: `russh 0.34.0`.</p>
<p>- Historical stronger case: `russh &gt;= 0.34.0, &lt; 0.58.0`. These releases have the allocation-first KEXINIT field parsing issue and still use `CryptoVec` for inbound packet/decompression buffers. A peer can combine negotiated RFC `zlib`, rekey, compressed KEXINIT expansion, historical `CryptoVec` decompression growth, and KEXINIT name-list fanout.
- Current maintained-line case: `russh &gt;= 0.58.0`, including `0.60.2`. These releases moved non-secret packet/decompression buffers off `CryptoVec`, but the allocation-first SSH field parser issue remains reachable as a `Vec`/`String`/name-list resource exhaustion issue.</p>
<p>Prerelease coverage was not claimed for the zlib/`CryptoVec`/KEXINIT combo because the combined historical exploit shape was verified against stable `v0.34.0`-era code and reproduced the stress behavior on `v0.57.1`.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The affected parser pattern appeared across the SS…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r3c-5hpg-58qr"/>
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