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EUVD-2026-340278

2026-10-05T17:09:37.250424+00:00

EUVD-2026-340278

fkie_cve-2026-48017

2026-10-05T17:09:37.250477+00:00

DbGate is cross-platform database manager. In versions 7.1.8 and prior, the POST /runners/load-reader endpoint in DbGate accepts a functionName parameter that is directly interpolated into a JavaScript code template without any sanitization or validation. An authenticated user (with basic access, no special permissions required) can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes on the server with full process privileges, bypassing the require=null sandbox restriction. An authenticated user with basic access (no admin role, no run-shell-script permission required) can: execute arbitrary OS commands on the DbGate server with the privileges of the Node.js process, read/write any file accessible to the process, pivot to connected databases by reading connection credentials from DbGate's storage, and compromise the host system - in Docker deployments, this typically means root access within the container. Version 7.1.9 contains a patch.

GHSA-hv83-ggc4-v385 — DbGate: Remote Code Execution via functionName injection in loadReader endpoint

2026-10-05T17:09:37.250523+00:00

Affected: npm: dbgate-api

### Summary

The `POST /runners/load-reader` endpoint in DbGate accepts a `functionName` parameter that is directly interpolated into a JavaScript code template without any sanitization or validation. An authenticated user (with basic access, no special permissions required) can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes on the server with full process privileges, bypassing the `require=null` sandbox restriction.

### Details

The `loadReader` endpoint in `packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js` (line 353) takes a `functionName` parameter from the request body and passes it to `compileShellApiFunctionName()` which performs no sanitization:

**Vulnerable code** ([permalink](https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/blob/ea3a61077ab09775c39890c465f0b3e97f6c812e/packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js#L352-L368)):

```javascript loadReader_meta: true, async loadReader({ functionName, props }) { if (!platformInfo.isElectron) { if (props?.fileName && !checkSecureDirectories(props.fileName)) { return { errorMessage: 'DBGM-00289 Unallowed file' }; } } const prefix = extractShellApiPlugins(functionName) .map(packageName => `// @require ${packageName}\n`) .join('');

const promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const runid = crypto.randomUUID(); this.requests[runid] = { resolve, reject, exitOnStreamError: true }; this.startCore(runid, loaderScriptTemplate(prefix, functionName, props, runid)); }); return p…