https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T12:00:37.487676+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338622 EUVD-2026-338622 2026-10-02T12:00:37.489682+00:00 EUVD-2026-338622 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47751 fkie_cve-2026-47751 2026-10-02T12:00:37.489711+00:00

Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an attacker who opened a pull request containing a malicious .mcp.json file could achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner and exfiltrate secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user or an automatic trigger invoked the Claude action on the pull request. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.74, which restores .claude/ and .mcp.json from the pull request base branch before the CLI runs.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8q5r-mmjf-575q GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q — Claude Code Action: Malicious MCP Server Configuration in PRs Enables Remote Code Execution and Secret Exfiltration 2026-10-02T12:00:37.489743+00:00

Affected: GitHub Actions: anthropics/claude-code-action

Due to the combination of checking out PR head branches (attacker-controlled), reading `.mcp.json` from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabling all project MCP servers via `enableAllProjectMcpServers`, it was possible for an attacker who opened a PR containing a malicious `.mcp.json` file to achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner. This could lead to exfiltration of secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user triggered the Claude action on the PR. Exploiting this required the ability to open a pull request against a repository using the claude-code-action and a privileged user or automatic trigger to invoke the action on that PR.

Users pinned to a vulnerable version of claude-code-action are advised to update to the latest version. Users referencing anthropics/claude-code-action@v1, anthropics/claude-code-action@beta, anthropics/claude-code-action@main, or other non-pinned tags will have received this fix already

Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/reptou for reporting this issue.