PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured. The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents. This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.

Affected: PyPI: PraisonAI

### Summary

PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured.

The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents.

This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane.

### Details

The vulnerable behavior is caused by a fail-open authentication default.

In `praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`, `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is read from the environment:

```python CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN') ```

The authentication dependency then returns successfully when the token is not configured:

```python async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None: if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN: return # No authentication if FastAPI unavailable or no token set ```

This means that the absence of `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` disables authentica…

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

### Summary

PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured.

The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents.

This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane.

### Details

The vulnerable behavior is caused by a fail-open authentication default.

In `praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`, `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is read from the environment:

```python CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN') ```

The authentication dependency then returns successfully when the token is not configured:

```python async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None: if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN: return # No authentication if FastAPI unavailable or no token set ``` This means that the absence of `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` disables authenti…