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  <updated>2026-10-06T07:57:26.914838+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329856</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-329856</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:57:26.916970+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-329856</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329856"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47388</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47388</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:57:26.917004+00:00</updated>
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        <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP readAttachment tool did not verify the file's ownership. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47388"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xxpj-q764-9r6q</id>
    <title>GHSA-xxpj-q764-9r6q — NocoDB: Missing Ownership Check in MCP Attachment Read</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:57:26.917036+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p>
<p>### Summary
A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any
file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces,
because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file's ownership.</p>
<p>### Details
The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams
the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in
`nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the
caller's MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns
`Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both
`download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles.</p>
<p>### Impact
Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller's MCP context
should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path.</p>
<p>### Credit
This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xxpj-q764-9r6q"/>
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