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  <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:05.890205+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329819</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-329819</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:05.892797+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-329819</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329819"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47387</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47387</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:05.892830+00:00</updated>
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        <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, the shared form-view submit handler (packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts) in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"]. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47387"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj85-ph9q-78jg</id>
    <title>GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg — NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:05.892865+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's `redirect_url` to `window.location.href` after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with `editor` role (or above) on any base can plant a `javascript:` URL in the form's `redirect_url`; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from `localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"]`.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The vulnerable sink is in `packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts`:</p>
<p>- `isValidRedirectUrl` validated only `typeof === 'string'` and non-empty trim — no scheme check.
- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared `anchor.host` to `window.location.host`, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assigned `window.location.href = redirectUrl` (otherwise).
- For non-network schemes such as `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, and `file:`, `anchor.host` is the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.</p>
<p>The `redirect_url` field is writable by any user with `editor` role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>- **Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab.** The payload runs in the NocoDB origin a…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj85-ph9q-78jg"/>
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