<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T05:02:09.696322+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330031</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-330031</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:02:09.749274+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-330031</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330031"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47386</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47386</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:02:09.749313+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, two concurrent token-exchange requests using the same OAuth authorization code could each mint a distinct valid (access_token, refresh_token) pair, breaking the single-use guarantee that PKCE relies on. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47386"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8m7c-hf24-5g47</id>
    <title>GHSA-8m7c-hf24-5g47 — NocoDB: OAuth Authorization Code Race Condition</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:02:09.749346+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p>
<p>### Summary
Two concurrent token-exchange requests using the same OAuth authorization code could
each mint a distinct valid `(access_token, refresh_token)` pair, breaking the
single-use guarantee that PKCE relies on.</p>
<p>### Details
The token-exchange flow read `is_used` and called `markAsUsed` as an unconditional
update at the end of the path. A new `OAuthAuthorizationCode.claimByCode` method now
performs an atomic compare-and-swap (`WHERE code = ? AND is_used = false`) and is
called immediately before `OAuthToken.insert`, after redirect-URI, PKCE, and client
authentication have all succeeded. Only the first concurrent caller's `UPDATE` wins;
the rest see `invalid_grant: Authorization code has already been used`.</p>
<p>### Impact
An attacker who has observed an authorization code and the corresponding PKCE
verifier (for example through a malicious OAuth-aware client or by racing a real
exchange) could obtain a long-lived refresh token in addition to the legitimate one.</p>
<p>### Credit
This issue was reported by [@eddieran](https://github.com/eddieran).</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8m7c-hf24-5g47"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
