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  <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:49.380972+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329857</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-329857</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:49.437926+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-329857</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329857"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47381</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47381</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:49.437970+00:00</updated>
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        <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the testConnection endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47381"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96fh-m4r8-6v9v</id>
    <title>GHSA-96fh-m4r8-6v9v — NocoDB: Cross-Workspace Integration Use in Connection Test</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T14:44:49.438009+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p>
<p>### Summary
A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the
`testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in
a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace.</p>
<p>### Details
The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and
checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an
owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped
to the integration's workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller
rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace.</p>
<p>### Impact
Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint,
including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's
credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace
was sufficient.</p>
<p>### Credit
This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96fh-m4r8-6v9v"/>
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