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  <updated>2026-10-06T18:41:57.246278+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326779</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-326779</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:41:57.278674+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-326779</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326779"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47174</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47174</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:41:57.278709+00:00</updated>
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        <p>In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47174"/>
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