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EUVD-2026-322099

2026-10-07T01:53:43.049749+00:00

EUVD-2026-322099

fkie_cve-2026-47070

2026-10-07T01:53:43.049787+00:00

Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. The HTTP/3 redirect handler in src/hackney_h3.erl passes the original request headers unchanged to the redirect target without performing any cross-origin check. When a client issues an HTTP/3 request with follow_redirect enabled and includes Authorization or Cookie headers, a server responding with a 3xx redirect to a different host will cause the client to forward those credentials verbatim to the new origin.

The main hackney.erl module has maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2 (guarded by the location_trusted option) to address CVE-2018-1000007, but hackney_h3.erl is missing this protection entirely.

This issue affects hackney: from 3.1.1 before 4.0.1.

GHSA-h73q-4w9q-82h4 — Hackney: Cross-origin Redirect Leaks Authorization, Cookie, and Request Body

2026-10-07T01:53:43.049825+00:00

Affected: Hex: hackney

### Summary

The HTTP/3 redirect handler in `src/hackney_h3.erl` forwards the original request headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`) and, for 307/308 responses, the original request body to the redirect target without checking whether the target host matches the origin. When `follow_redirect` is enabled and a server responds with a cross-origin `Location`, hackney delivers the caller's credentials verbatim to the attacker-controlled host. The main hackney HTTP/1 client has `maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2` (the fix for CVE-2018-1000007); the H3 client was added later without it.

### Details

In `src/hackney_h3.erl`, `handle_redirect/11` (line 165) extracts the redirect target from the server-controlled `Location` header via `get_redirect_location/1` and resolves it with `resolve_redirect_url/2`, which accepts any absolute `http://` or `https://` URL. It then calls `do_request_with_redirect/8` passing the original `Headers` list unchanged. For 307/308 responses, `redirect_method/2` preserves the original method and body, so the POST body is also forwarded.

No comparison is made between the original URL's scheme, host, or port and the redirect target. The downstream `connect/3` opens a new QUIC connection to whatever the `Location` header named, and `build_request_headers/4` serializes the unmodified headers into the QPACK-encoded request.

### PoC

1. Issue an HTTP/3 POST to an attacker-controlled origin with `follow_redirect => true` and an `Authorizati…