<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-08T00:27:06.240966+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338957</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-338957</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T00:27:06.273692+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-338957</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338957"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46555</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-46555</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T00:27:06.273730+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a c…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46555"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
