https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-07T19:20:50.153125+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330152 EUVD-2026-330152 2026-10-07T19:20:50.209009+00:00 EUVD-2026-330152 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46553 fkie_cve-2026-46553 2026-10-07T19:20:50.209054+00:00

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the upload-by-URL path did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against either the remote file's advertised Content-Length or the decoded length of a data: URI, allowing an authenticated user to bypass the configured per-file size limit. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rwr-f68v-cvw6 GHSA-8rwr-f68v-cvw6 — NocoDB: Attachment Size Limit Bypass via Upload-by-URL 2026-10-07T19:20:50.209104+00:00

Affected: npm: nocodb

### Summary The upload-by-URL path did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against either the remote file's advertised `Content-Length` or the decoded length of a `data:` URI, allowing an authenticated user to bypass the configured per-file size limit.

### Details The attachments service now checks `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against both the HEAD response's `content-length` and the decoded length of a `data:` URI body before fetching. The local storage plugin additionally sets `maxContentLength` on the axios download so a malicious server cannot stream past the limit.

### Impact Authenticated users with upload permission could attach files larger than the operator-configured limit, defeating storage and bandwidth caps.

### Credit This issue was reported by [@bugbunny-research](https://github.com/bugbunny-research).