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EUVD-2026-329859

2026-10-06T09:30:22.009226+00:00

EUVD-2026-329859

fkie_cve-2026-46552

2026-10-06T09:30:22.009268+00:00

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link. Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp — NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members

2026-10-06T09:30:22.009306+00:00

Affected: npm: nocodb

### Summary

Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (`xc-shared-base-id`), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.

### Details

Shared-base sessions were mapped to `ProjectRoles.VIEWER` in `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts`, and `packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts` granted `baseUserList` and `userInvite` to that role. The shared frontend (`packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts`) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.

The end-to-end chain:

- `GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` returned the member list to shared-base callers (`@Acl('baseUserList')`). - `POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` accepted an invite from shared-base callers (`@Acl('userInvite')`); `base-users.service.ts` inserted a real `nc_users_v2` row with `invite_token` and a `nc_base_users_v2` row for the target base, with `invited_by = null`. - The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (`users.service.ts`), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base. - Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.

### I…