https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T04:16:39.622158+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329810 EUVD-2026-329810 2026-10-06T04:16:39.669601+00:00 EUVD-2026-329810 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46549 fkie_cve-2026-46549 2026-10-06T04:16:39.669646+00:00

NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m5qg-rvjq-727p GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p — NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation 2026-10-06T04:16:39.669697+00:00

Affected: npm: nocodb

### Summary

The OAuth token strategy attached `oauth_scope` and `oauth_granted_resources` to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the `granted_resources.base_id` restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate `req.context.base_id`.

### Details

In `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts`, the strategy set `is_oauth_token`, `oauth_client_id`, `oauth_granted_resources`, and `oauth_scope` on the user object, then mapped through to the user's existing `roles` / `base_roles`. The ACL middleware in `extract-ids.middleware.ts` honoured `is_api_token` via `blockApiTokenAccess` but had no equivalent gate for `is_oauth_token` or scope-string enforcement.

The base/workspace restriction logic short-circuited when `req.context.base_id` was unset (org-level routes), so an OAuth token scoped to one base could still call org-level endpoints as the underlying user.

The fix adds a path-prefix allowlist (`['/mcp', '/api/v3/', '/auth/user/me']`) enforced inside the strategy and a `blockOAuthTokenAccess` ACL flag for endpoints that should never accept OAuth tokens.

### Impact

- Scope escalation: tokens issued with a narrow scope received the underlying user's full role. - Resource boundary bypass: per-base restrictions did not apply to org-level routes. - Violates least-privilege exp…