MVT (Mobile Verification Toolkit) helps with conducting forensics of mobile devices in order to find signs of a potential compromise. Prior to version 2026.5.12, there is a path traversal vulnerability via unsanitized File identifiers in iOS Backup processing. This issue has been patched in version 2026.5.12.

Affected: PyPI: mvt

### Summary

The `fileID` field from `Manifest.db` (a SQLite database inside iOS backups, generated by the device) is used directly in filesystem path construction without validation. This affects two commands through a shared code path:

- **`mvt-ios decrypt-backup`** (`decrypt.py`): `file_id` is used to construct both read source and write destination paths. Traversal sequences in `file_id` cause decrypted content to be written to an arbitrary location on the analyst's filesystem. - **`mvt-ios check-backup`** (via `_get_backup_file_from_id()` in `ios/modules/base.py`): the same unvalidated `fileID` resolves to files outside the backup directory, which are then opened and parsed. Parsed contents flow into JSON results and CSV timeline.

### Impact

**File write (decrypt-backup):** An adversary delivering a crafted iOS backup can cause attacker controlled content to be written to arbitrary paths writable by the analyst process. This could be leveraged for code execution via shell profile modification or SSH key injection. Severity is assessed as Moderate because exploitation requires a specifically crafted malicious bundle to be parsed by the analyst. There are trust mitigations between stakeholders involved in the handoff of the sample that reduce the likelihood of this scenario.

**File read (check-backup):** An adversary can force MVT to open and parse files outside the backup directory. Practical exploitation is reduced as it requires the attacker to know or guess the an…

Affected: PyPI: mvt

### Summary

The `fileID` field from `Manifest.db` (a SQLite database inside iOS backups, generated by the device) is used directly in filesystem path construction without validation. This affects two commands through a shared code path:

- **`mvt-ios decrypt-backup`** (`decrypt.py`): `file_id` is used to construct both read source and write destination paths. Traversal sequences in `file_id` cause decrypted content to be written to an arbitrary location on the analyst's filesystem. - **`mvt-ios check-backup`** (via `_get_backup_file_from_id()` in `ios/modules/base.py`): the same unvalidated `fileID` resolves to files outside the backup directory, which are then opened and parsed. Parsed contents flow into JSON results and CSV timeline.

### Impact

**File write (decrypt-backup):** An adversary delivering a crafted iOS backup can cause attacker controlled content to be written to arbitrary paths writable by the analyst process. This could be leveraged for code execution via shell profile modification or SSH key injection. Severity is assessed as Moderate because exploitation requires a specifically crafted malicious bundle to be parsed by the analyst. There are trust mitigations between stakeholders involved in the handoff of the sample that reduce the likelihood of this scenario.

**File read (check-backup):** An adversary can force MVT to open and parse files outside the backup directory. Practical exploitation is reduced as it requires the attacker to know or guess the an…