Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.38.1, Budibase exposes a REST API for datasource management. The route PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId is registered in the authorizedRoutes group with TABLE/READ permission. This is the same authorization level as the read endpoint (GET /api/datasources/:datasourceId). Every authenticated Budibase app user with the BASIC built-in role or higher carries TABLE/WRITE (and therefore TABLE/READ) permissions, and the datasource update controller performs no additional builder check. As a result, any authenticated non-builder app user can submit a PUT request to rewrite a datasource's config object — including the connection host, port, database credentials, or the base url of a REST datasource. Because no network-level SSRF protection is applied to SQL driver connections, redirecting a PostgreSQL/MySQL/MongoDB datasource to an internal IP address succeeds and the attacker can probe or interact with internal services on arbitrary ports. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.38.1.

Affected: npm: @budibase/server

## Summary

Budibase exposes a REST API for datasource management. The route `PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId` is registered in the `authorizedRoutes` group with `TABLE/READ` permission. This is the same authorization level as the read endpoint (`GET /api/datasources/:datasourceId`). Every authenticated Budibase app user with the `BASIC` built-in role or higher carries `TABLE/WRITE` (and therefore `TABLE/READ`) permissions, and the datasource update controller performs no additional builder check.

As a result, any authenticated non-builder app user can submit a `PUT` request to rewrite a datasource's `config` object — including the connection `host`, `port`, database credentials, or the base `url` of a REST datasource. Because no network-level SSRF protection is applied to SQL driver connections, redirecting a PostgreSQL/MySQL/MongoDB datasource to an internal IP address succeeds and the attacker can probe or interact with internal services on arbitrary ports.

## Code evidence

### Route registration — wrong authorization group

``` packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts, line 35-37 ```

```typescript authorizedRoutes .get("/api/datasources/:datasourceId", datasourceController.find) .put("/api/datasources/:datasourceId", datasourceController.update) // <-- should be builderRoutes ```

All destructive (create/delete/verify) operations are gated behind `builderRoutes`:

```typescript builderRoutes .get("/api/datasources", datasourceController.fetch) .post(…

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen und Daten zu manipulieren.