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  <updated>2026-10-08T18:43:30.234829+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323618</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-323618</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T18:43:30.288496+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-323618</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323618"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45626</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-45626</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T18:43:30.288551+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. In 1.18.1 and earlier, GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45626"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp</id>
    <title>GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp — Arcane Backend: OS Command Injection in Volume Browser ListDirectory via path query parameter</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T18:43:30.288621+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse` accepts a `path` query parameter that is passed to a shell command (`sh -c "find … | while …"`) inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks `../` traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks, and `strconv.Quote` only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The execution flow is:</p>
<p>1. `BrowseDirectoryInput.Path` (query: `path`) — `backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:148`
2. `VolumeHandler.BrowseDirectory` calls `volumeService.ListDirectory(ctx, volumeName, input.Path)` — `backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:858-865`. Note the route registration at line 412–419 only declares `BearerAuth`/`ApiKeyAuth`; there is no `checkAdmin(ctx)` call (compare with `customize.go`, `system.go`, `swarm.go`, etc., which do enforce admin).
3. `VolumeService.ListDirectory` runs the user-supplied path through `sanitizeBrowsePathInternal`, then joins it under `/volume`, quotes it with `strconv.Quote`, and embeds it into a `sh -c` command:</p>
<p>```go
// backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:286-300
sanitizedPath, err := s.sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(dirPath)
...
targetPath := path.Join("/volume", sanitizedPath)
quotedPath := strconv.Quote(targetPath)
cmd := […</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp"/>
  </entry>
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