https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-08T17:27:12.779145+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322754 EUVD-2026-322754 2026-10-08T17:27:12.827698+00:00 EUVD-2026-322754 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45610 fkie_cve-2026-45610 2026-10-08T17:27:12.827743+00:00

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, there is a cross-site request forgery vulnerability on the 2FA toggle. plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php accepts POST type=set2FA value=false, calls LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), false) on the session-authenticated user, and returns. There is no forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() call, no isTokenValid() check, no X-CSRF-Token/SameSite enforcement, and no re-authentication step. A cross-origin page that the victim visits while logged into the AVideo dashboard issues the POST via a hidden form (or fetch without credentials:"omit") and disables the victim's 2FA in one request.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3mv2-vmwh-rwfx GHSA-3mv2-vmwh-rwfx — AVideo: 2FA toggle endpoint has no CSRF protection, letting an attacker page silently disable a logged-in victim's 2FA 2026-10-08T17:27:12.827780+00:00

Affected: Packagist: WWBN/AVideo

## Summary

**Type:** Cross-site request forgery on the 2FA toggle. `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php` accepts `POST type=set2FA value=false`, calls `LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), false)` on the session-authenticated user, and returns. There is no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` call, no `isTokenValid()` check, no `X-CSRF-Token`/`SameSite` enforcement, and no re-authentication step. A cross-origin page that the victim visits while logged into the AVideo dashboard issues the POST via a hidden form (or `fetch` without `credentials:"omit"`) and disables the victim's 2FA in one request. The next phishing/credential-stuffing attempt against that account no longer needs the second factor. **File:** `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php`, lines 1-37. **Root cause:** the developer relied on the `User::isLogged()` check at line 9 as the only auth, then dispatched directly into `LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $value=='true')`. Other AVideo state-changing endpoints in the same codebase (`videoUpdateUsage.json.php`, `videoStatus.json.php`, `videoRotate.json.php`, etc.) call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('<name>')` to compare `Origin`/`Referer` against the AVideo domain; this endpoint simply omits the call. The session cookie carries the user's identity on every cross-origin POST, so any attacker page can speak for the logged-in user on this endpoint.

## Affected Code

**File:** `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php`, lines 1-37.

```php <?php require_once '../../videos/configur…