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  <updated>2026-10-06T13:40:11.240525+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349506</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-349506</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:40:11.287586+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-349506</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349506"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45573</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-45573</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:40:11.287623+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Prior to 0.30.9, from 0.31.0 before 0.31.5, and in 0.32.0.rc1 before 0.32.0.rc2, when VAPID delivery is enabled, the notification subscription flow stores a client-supplied push endpoint without validating that it belongs to an approved push service, and SendPushNotification later passes that endpoint to WebPush.payload_send, allowing an authenticated user to create stored, mostly blind server-side requests to arbitrary reachable HTTPS endpoints. This issue is fixed in versions 0.30.9, 0.31.5, and 0.32.0.rc2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45573"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2g9c-vf8h-prxx</id>
    <title>GHSA-2g9c-vf8h-prxx — Decidim: Push subscriptions can be abused for server-side requests</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:40:11.287656+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: decidim-core</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>The push-subscription endpoint stores an attacker-controlled delivery URL, and the notification send path becomes an outbound-request sink when VAPID delivery is enabled. The practical result is an authenticated, stored, mostly blind SSRF primitive to arbitrary HTTPS endpoints reachable from the app server.</p>
<p>## Technical description
 
When VAPID delivery is enabled, the notification subscription flow stores the client-supplied push endpoint without checking that it belongs to an approved push service. The send path later passes that stored URL to `WebPush.payload_send`, turning the subscription into an attacker-controlled outbound request destination.
This is the source-to-sink chain:</p>
<p>1. Source: attacker-controlled `subscription.endpoint` in the JSON body posted to `POST /notifications_subscriptions`.
2. Persistence: `params[:endpoint]` is stored under `user.notification_settings["subscriptions"]`.
3. Retrieval: `user.notifications_subscriptions.values` returns that stored endpoint later.
4. Sink: `build_payload` sets `endpoint: subscription["endpoint"]`.
5. Outbound request: `WebPush.payload_send(**payload)` uses the attacker-supplied endpoint as the
destination.</p>
<p>One spec asserts that the endpoint is persisted exactly as supplied:</p>
<p>```ruby
# decidim-core/spec/services/decidim/notifications_subscriptions_persistor_spec.rb
expect(user.notifications_subscriptions["auth_code_121"]["endpoint"]).to eq(params[:endpoint])
```</p>
<p>Another spec asserts that `SendPushNo…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2g9c-vf8h-prxx"/>
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