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EUVD-2026-319110

2026-10-09T16:12:15.826005+00:00

EUVD-2026-319110

fkie_cve-2026-45375

2026-10-09T16:12:15.826043+00:00

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package's plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description — Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.

GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r — SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package `name` and `version` metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron cod…

2026-10-09T16:12:15.826084+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

### Summary

SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the `name` and `version` fields of a package's `plugin.json` (and the equivalent `theme.json` / `template.json` / `widget.json` / `icon.json`) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` in `kernel/bazaar/package.go` HTML-escapes only `Author`, `DisplayName`, and `Description` — `Name` and `Version` flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` substitutes them into HTML template strings via `${item.preferredName}` / `${data.name}` / `v${data.version}` and assigns the result to `innerHTML`. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.

Because the desktop client is built on Electron with `nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`, and `webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim's account. The trigger is **zero-click on the list view** — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.

A second `preferredName` path exists: when `displayName: {}` (empty locale map), `GetPreferredLocaleString` falls back to the unescaped `pkg.Name`, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.…