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  <updated>2026-10-04T17:20:38.293413+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338624</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-338624</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T17:20:38.343211+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-338624</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338624"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45367</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-45367</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T17:20:38.343264+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.7, the FHIRPathEngine implementation passes user-controlled regular expressions from matches(), matchesFull(), and replaceMatches() to Java regex operations without effective timeouts, allowing catastrophic backtracking and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.7.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45367"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3653-68v6-rq57</id>
    <title>GHSA-3653-68v6-rq57 — HAPI FHIR: ReDoS via FHIRPath matches()/replaceMatches() in FHIR Validator HTTP Endpoint</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T17:20:38.343298+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2016may, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu3, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4b, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>All implementations of FHIRPathEngine accept arbitrary FHIRPath expressions and evaluate them without input validation. The FHIRPath functions `matches()`, `matchesFull()`, and `replaceMatches()` pass user-controlled regular expressions directly to Java's `Pattern.compile()` and `String.replaceAll()` without complexity checks or timeouts. An attacker can send a resource containing an evil regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, exhausting system resources, and causing Denial-of-Service.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The vulnerability exists in regex execution in FHIRPathEngine implementations across multiple code modules. For example the org.hl7.fhir.r5 module:</p>
<p>**Entry point 1 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5929` (R5 `funcMatches`):**
```java
private List&lt;Base&gt; funcMatches(ExecutionContext context, List&lt;Base&gt; focus, ExpressionNode exp) {
    String sw = convertToString(swb); // attacker-controlled regex pattern
    // ...
    Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?s)" + sw); // VULNERABLE: no complexity check
    Matcher m = p.matcher(st);                // no timeout
    boolean ok = m.find();
```</p>
<p>**Entry point 2 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5951` (R5 `funcMatchesFull`):**
```java
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?s)" + sw); // VULNERABLE: same pattern
Matcher m = p.matcher(st);
boolean ok = m.matches();
```</p>
<p>**Entry point 3 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5120` (R5 `funcReplaceMatches`):**
```java
result.add(new StringType(convertToString(focus.get(0))
    .replaceAll(regex, repl)).noExtensions(…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3653-68v6-rq57"/>
  </entry>
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