https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-12T20:58:06.026745+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-324033 EUVD-2026-324033 2026-10-12T20:58:06.079159+00:00 EUVD-2026-324033 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45136 fkie_cve-2026-45136 2026-10-12T20:58:06.079194+00:00

claude-code-cache-fix is a cache optimization proxy for Claude Code. From 3.5.0 to before 3.5.2, tools/quota-statusline.sh (introduced in v3.5.0) interpolates Claude Code's hook stdin payload directly into a Python triple-quoted string literal. A ''' byte sequence in any user-controlled field of the payload closes the literal early and lets following bytes execute as Python in the user's Claude Code process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.5.2.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g3xq-3gmv-qq8g GHSA-g3xq-3gmv-qq8g — claude-code-cache-fix vulnerable to local code execution via Python triple-quote injection in tools/quota-statusline.sh 2026-10-12T20:58:06.079231+00:00

Affected: npm: claude-code-cache-fix

## Summary

`tools/quota-statusline.sh` (introduced in v3.5.0) interpolates Claude Code's hook stdin payload directly into a Python triple-quoted string literal. A `'''` byte sequence in any user-controlled field of the payload closes the literal early and lets following bytes execute as Python in the user's Claude Code process.

## Affected versions

- v3.5.0 - v3.5.1

## Patched versions

- v3.5.2

## Affected configurations

Users who wired `tools/quota-statusline.sh` into Claude Code's `statusLine` configuration. The v3.5.0 README explicitly recommends this setup, so most users on v3.5.0/v3.5.1 with the recommended setup are affected.

## Attack chain

Claude Code's statusline hook payload reflects user-controlled paths (`cwd`, `workspace.current_dir`, `workspace.project_dir`, `transcript_path`). Apostrophes are legal in POSIX filesystem paths.

1. A hostile directory name containing `'''+payload+'''` lands on disk via any normal vector — `git clone`, archive extraction, npm package, downloaded zip, etc. 2. The victim has the recommended `tools/quota-statusline.sh` wired into their CC `statusLine` config. 3. The victim `cd`s anywhere a hostile path is reachable. 4. CC fires the statusline hook on every redraw. The Python literal closes early. The injected bytes execute as Python in the user's process.

## Severity

Local code execution at user privilege. Persistent re-fire on every statusline redraw. No user interaction beyond `cd`-ing into the hostile path. The user's s…