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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-08T01:31:10.614630+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-n8n-mcp-cve-2026-44694</id>
    <title>BREW-n8n-mcp-CVE-2026-44694 — n8n-mcp webhook and API client paths has an authenticated SSRF</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T01:31:10.617776+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: n8n-mcp</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (`N8N_API_URL`), and per-request URLs supplied via the `x-n8n-url` header in multi-tenant HTTP mode.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel.</p>
<p>- **Multi-tenant HTTP deployments** where tenants share an `AUTH_TOKEN`: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials.
- **Single-tenant deployments**: indirect prompt injection through tool arguments reaches the same surface; an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool calls can read internal services from the n8n-mcp host.
- **Stdio deployments** are reachable via the same prompt-injection path.</p>
<p>### Patched Versions</p>
<p>Fixed in `n8n-mcp@2.50.2`.</p>
<p>**Note for operators:** The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If `N8N_API_URL` points at `http://localhost:5678` (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=moderate` (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MO…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-n8n-mcp-cve-2026-44694"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-316823</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-316823</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T01:31:10.617850+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-316823</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-316823"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44694</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-44694</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T01:31:10.617868+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. From version 2.18.7 to before version 2.50.2, there is an authenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (N8N_API_URL), and per-request URLs supplied via the x-n8n-url header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. This issue has been patched in version 2.50.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44694"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cmrh-wvq6-wm9r</id>
    <title>GHSA-cmrh-wvq6-wm9r — n8n-mcp webhook and API client paths has an authenticated SSRF</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T01:31:10.617891+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: n8n-mcp</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (`N8N_API_URL`), and per-request URLs supplied via the `x-n8n-url` header in multi-tenant HTTP mode.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel.</p>
<p>- **Multi-tenant HTTP deployments** where tenants share an `AUTH_TOKEN`: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials.
- **Single-tenant deployments**: indirect prompt injection through tool arguments reaches the same surface; an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool calls can read internal services from the n8n-mcp host.
- **Stdio deployments** are reachable via the same prompt-injection path.</p>
<p>### Patched Versions</p>
<p>Fixed in `n8n-mcp@2.50.2`.</p>
<p>**Note for operators:** The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If `N8N_API_URL` points at `http://localhost:5678` (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=moderate` (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MO…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cmrh-wvq6-wm9r"/>
  </entry>
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