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  <updated>2026-10-07T21:09:57.197482+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318688</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-318688</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:09:57.247102+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-318688</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318688"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44498</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-44498</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:09:57.247141+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS), allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while zcashd nodes do not. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44498"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jv4h-j224-23cc</id>
    <title>GHSA-jv4h-j224-23cc — Zebra's Block Validator Undercounts Coinbase and P2SH Sigops</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:09:57.247177+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad</p>
<p>Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not.</p>
<p>Two distinct undercounts:</p>
<p>#### A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops</p>
<p>`zcashd`'s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input's `scriptSig`. Zebra's `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase `scriptSig` without being charged against the block limit.</p>
<p>#### B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops.</p>
<p>`zcashd`'s `GetP2SHSigOpCount()` parses each P2SH input's redeem script with `accurate=true` and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via `ConnectBlock`. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by `zcashd`.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in this release:  https://github.com/ZcashFound…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jv4h-j224-23cc"/>
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