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EUVD-2026-318991

2026-10-06T22:41:40.643473+00:00

EUVD-2026-318991

fkie_cve-2026-44429

2026-10-06T22:41:40.643511+00:00

The MCP Registry provides MCP clients with a list of MCP servers, like an app store for MCP servers. Prior to 1.7.7, the public catalogue UI served at GET / (file internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via the server.websiteUrl field of any published server.json. Server-side validation in internal/validators/validators.go (validateWebsiteURL) only checks that the URL parses, is absolute, and uses the https scheme; it does not reject quote characters. Client-side, the value is interpolated into a double-quoted href attribute via innerHTML, using a homegrown escapeHtml helper that performs the standard textContent → innerHTML round-trip. Per the HTML serialisation algorithm, that round-trip encodes only &, <, > and U+00A0 inside text nodes — it does not encode " or '. A literal " in websiteUrl therefore breaks out of the href attribute, allowing arbitrary on* event handlers to be appended to the same element. The Content-Security-Policy on / is script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com, so the injected event handlers execute. Any user able to obtain a publish token (e.g. via POST /v0/auth/github-at with their own GitHub account, or POST /v0/auth/none on a deployment that has anonymous auth enabled) can plant a poisoned record visible to every visitor of the registry homepage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.7.

GHSA-rqv2-m695-f8j4 — MCP Registry vulnerable to stored XSS in catalogue UI via attribute-quote breakout in publisher-controlled `websiteUrl`

2026-10-06T22:41:40.643558+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry

## Summary

The public catalogue UI served at `GET /` (file `internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html`) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via the `server.websiteUrl` field of any published `server.json`. Server-side validation in `internal/validators/validators.go` (`validateWebsiteURL`) only checks that the URL parses, is absolute, and uses the `https` scheme; it does not reject quote characters. Client-side, the value is interpolated into a double-quoted `href` attribute via `innerHTML`, using a homegrown `escapeHtml` helper that performs the standard `textContent` → `innerHTML` round-trip. Per the HTML serialisation algorithm, that round-trip encodes only `&`, `<`, `>` and U+00A0 inside text nodes — it does **not** encode `"` or `'`. A literal `"` in `websiteUrl` therefore breaks out of the `href` attribute, allowing arbitrary `on*` event handlers to be appended to the same `` element. The Content-Security-Policy on `/` is `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com`, so the injected event handlers execute.

Any user able to obtain a publish token (e.g. via `POST /v0/auth/github-at` with their own GitHub account, or `POST /v0/auth/none` on a deployment that has anonymous auth enabled) can plant a poisoned record visible to every visitor of the registry homepage.

## Affected component

- Validator: `internal/validators/validators.go` — `validateWebsiteURL` (lines 153–199) - Sink: `internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html` — `toggleDetails(card…