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EUVD-2026-318992

2026-10-07T01:27:10.940871+00:00

EUVD-2026-318992

fkie_cve-2026-44428

2026-10-07T01:27:10.940905+00:00

The MCP Registry provides MCP clients with a list of MCP servers, like an app store for MCP servers. Prior to 1.7.6, the client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends audience=mcp-registry when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected --registry URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from repository_owner. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one registry deployment remains acceptable to any other deployment that shares the same code and audience string. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.6.

GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq — MCP Registry's GitHub OIDC tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audience

2026-10-07T01:27:10.940938+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry

# [SECURITY] registry_001 Vulnerability Report

While analyzing the code logic, an area that may lead to unintended behavior under specific conditions was discovered.

## Overview - Verified Version: `c5c4b9e8890dd5754bee889b2f1417f4fe3b5ce5` - Vulnerability Type: Authentication bypass via cross-registry OIDC token replay - Affected Location: `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224`; `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38,58-75,108-165`; `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135,229-277,280-296` - Trigger Scenario: a workflow invokes `mcp-publisher login github-oidc --registry ` (or equivalent publish flow) and the publisher still requests a GitHub Actions ID token with the shared audience `mcp-registry`; any other registry deployment running this code can replay that token to its own `/v0/auth/github-oidc` endpoint and mint a publish-capable registry JWT for the same GitHub owner namespace.

## Root Cause The client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends `audience=mcp-registry` when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected `--registry` URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from `repository_owner`. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one r…