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EUVD-2026-318578

2026-10-07T23:57:22.751760+00:00

EUVD-2026-318578

fkie_cve-2026-44351

2026-10-07T23:57:22.751804+00:00

fast-jwt provides fast JSON Web Token (JWT) implementation. Prior to 6.2.4, a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in fast-jwt's async key-resolver flow allows any unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWTs that are accepted as authentic. When the application's key resolver returns an empty string (''), for example via the common keys[decoded.header.kid] || '' JWKS-style fallback, fast-jwt converts it to a zero-length Buffer, hands it to crypto.createSecretKey, derives allowedAlgorithms = ['HS256','HS384','HS512'] from it, and then verifies the token's signature against an empty-key HMAC. The attacker simply computes HMAC-SHA256(key='', input='${header}.${payload}'), which Node accepts without complaint — and the verifier returns the attacker-chosen payload (sub, admin, scopes, etc.) as authentic. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.4.

GHSA-gmvf-9v4p-v8jc — fast-jwt: JWT auth bypass due to empty HMAC secret accepted by async key resolver

2026-10-07T23:57:22.751851+00:00

Affected: npm: fast-jwt

### Summary

A critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in `fast-jwt`'s async key-resolver flow allows any unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWTs that are accepted as authentic. When the application's key resolver returns an empty string (`''`), for example via the common `keys[decoded.header.kid] || ''` JWKS-style fallback, fast-jwt converts it to a zero-length `Buffer`, hands it to `crypto.createSecretKey`, derives `allowedAlgorithms = ['HS256','HS384','HS512']` from it, and then verifies the token's signature against an empty-key HMAC. The attacker simply computes `HMAC-SHA256(key='', input='${header}.${payload}')`, which Node accepts without complaint — and the verifier returns the attacker-chosen payload (sub, admin, scopes, etc.) as authentic. Reproducible 100% against the current latest release `fast-jwt@6.2.3`.

### Preconditions

For this issue to occur the following MUST ALL be true:

1. The application developer (library consumer) uses an asynchronous callback function to set the key (e.g. `createVerifier({key: async (decoded) => ... })`) 2. The response from the async callback MUST return an empty string `''` OR zero-length buffer (e.g. `Buffer.alloc(0)`). Any other empty/missing return values (e.g. null, undefined) do not trigger this issue 3. The library configuration must allow HMAC signatures. This is the default for the library. 4. The bad actor MUST have signed their token with an empty string. This is a trivial task and requires no special kn…