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  <updated>2026-10-05T20:28:18.053168+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335627</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-335627</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T20:28:19.244785+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-335627</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335627"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44342</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-44342</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T20:28:19.244855+00:00</updated>
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        <p>New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to 0.12.0-alpha.1, the email and WeChat account binding endpoints GET /api/oauth/email/bind and GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind used GET requests for state-changing account operations, allowing an attacker to trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity in deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations. This issue is fixed in version 0.12.0-alpha.1.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44342"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-26v7-h57m-gh9m</id>
    <title>GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m — New API is vulnerable to CSRF through user email binding</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T20:28:19.244926+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The email and WeChat account binding endpoints used GET requests for state-changing account operations. In deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations, an attacker could trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity.</p>
<p>Affected endpoints included:</p>
<p>- `GET /api/oauth/email/bind`
- `GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind`</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>A successful attack could change account binding state. For email binding, the attacker could bind an email address they control and then attempt follow-on account recovery flows. The default session cookie configuration uses `SameSite=Strict`, which mitigates common cross-site navigation attacks in modern browsers, so the issue is rated Medium.</p>
<p>## Affected versions</p>
<p>Versions before `v0.12.0-alpha.1` are affected.</p>
<p>## Patches</p>
<p>This issue is fixed in `v0.12.0-alpha.1`. The fix changes email and WeChat binding routes from GET to POST and reads parameters from a JSON request body instead of query parameters. The same change set also normalizes password reset responses to avoid disclosing whether an email is registered.</p>
<p>## Workarounds</p>
<p>If upgrading immediately is not possible, ensure session cookies are configured with strict SameSite behavior and block GET requests to `/api/oauth/email/bind` and `/api/oauth/wechat/bind` at the reverse proxy.</p>
<p>## Resources</p>
<p>- Fixed by commit `e099117c61391abdf888fb75e382a582e550bd0e`.
- Relevant code paths: `router/api-router.go` and `c…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-26v7-h57m-gh9m"/>
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