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  <updated>2026-10-08T13:22:19.999208+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322187</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-322187</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:22:20.054944+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-322187</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322187"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44315</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-44315</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:22:20.054990+00:00</updated>
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        <p>free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the 3gpp-pfd-management API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token). The route group is also reachable even when the running config's ServiceList does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44315"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5f62-53r8-qrqf</id>
    <title>GHSA-5f62-53r8-qrqf — free5GC's NEF 3gpp-pfd-management API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can create, read, and delete PFD transac…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:22:20.055028+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/free5gc/nef</p>
<p>### Summary
free5GC's NEF mounts the `3gpp-pfd-management` API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`). The route group is also reachable even when the running config's `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.</p>
<p>### Details
Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.
- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`
- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.0`
- Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab`
- Docker validation date: 2026-03-11</p>
<p>NEF advertises `OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true`, and its `ServiceList` only declares `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`. Despite that, the `3gpp-pfd-management` route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.</p>
<p>Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`):
- Route group mounted without auth middleware: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:52`
- Transaction routes exposed at `/:scsAsID/transactions` and `/:scsAsID/transactions/:transID`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:13`
- Create handler still contains `// TODO: Authorize the AF`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:70`
- POST allocates a new PFD transaction and writes to UDR: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:63`
- GET reads transaction state: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:189`
-…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5f62-53r8-qrqf"/>
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