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  <updated>2026-10-09T05:05:51.017053+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322126</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-322126</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T05:05:51.065092+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-322126</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322126"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44213</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-44213</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T05:05:51.065133+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana exports telemetry to Instana backend. Prior to 1.1.0, the OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana NuGet package does not validate HTTPS/TLS certificates are valid when sending telemetry to a configured Instana back-end when a proxy is configured using the INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY environment variable. If a network attacker can Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) the proxy connection, all OpenTelemetry telemetry data and the Instana API key are exposed to the attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44213"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wfr5-454p-mjc2</id>
    <title>GHSA-wfr5-454p-mjc2 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T05:05:51.065206+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana` NuGet package does not validate HTTPS/TLS certificates are valid when sending telemetry to a configured Instana back-end when a proxy is configured using the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable.</p>
<p>If a network attacker can Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) the proxy connection, all OpenTelemetry telemetry data and the Instana API key are exposed to the attacker.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The [`Transport.ConfigureBackendClient()`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/blob/b53b6a74fde21a4cee344e584b51a0fe5bf1f337/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana/Implementation/Transport.cs#L132-L158) method creates an `HttpClient` instance that completely disables TLS server certificate validation if the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` is configured with a valid proxy URL with no ability to re-enable it.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>If the configured proxy is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker MitM the connection), or if it is possible for the process' configuration to be changed to add an attacker-provided value for `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` then all Instana telemetry could be read by an unauthorized party and the service's Instana API key compromised, potentially before being forwarded to Instana presenting no noticeable loss of telemetry data without a valid TLS server certificate being presented to the client that matches the expected hostname or IP address.</p>
<p>### Mitigation</p>
<p>The proxy configured by the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment v…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wfr5-454p-mjc2"/>
  </entry>
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