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  <updated>2026-10-17T11:45:08.048513+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317286</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-317286</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:45:08.117252+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-317286</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317286"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43884</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-43884</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:45:08.117322+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, two endpoints (plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php and objects/EpgParser.php) in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare file_get_contents() without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections. Commit 603e7bf77a835584387327e35560262feb075db3 contains an updated fix.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43884"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2hch-c97c-g99x</id>
    <title>GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x — AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:45:08.117377+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Two endpoints in AVideo call `isSSRFSafeURL()` to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare `file_get_contents()` **without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following**. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). Since `isSSRFSafeURL()` only validates the *initial* URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.</p>
<p>A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of `isSSRFSafeURL()` discard the `$resolvedIP` out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.</p>
<p>**Severity:** High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>#### Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass</p>
<p>**Vulnerable code — `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` (line ~162–165):**</p>
<p>```php
// SSRF Protection: Validate URL before fetching
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($imageUrl)) {
    // blocked
} else {
    $imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
}
```</p>
<p>**Vulnerable code — `objects/EpgParser.php` (line ~358–362):**</p>
<p>```php
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($this-&gt;url)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException('URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
$this-&gt;content = @file_get_contents($this-&gt;url);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
```</p>
<p>**Safe code for comparison — `objects/functions.php`, `url_get_contents()`:**</p>
<p>```php
$opts = ['http' =&gt; ['follow_location' =&gt; 0]];  // Disable auto-redirect
$context = stream…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2hch-c97c-g99x"/>
  </entry>
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