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  <updated>2026-10-07T07:04:23.926397+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317321</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-317321</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:04:23.978748+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-317321</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317321"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42845</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-42845</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:04:23.978787+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The form plugin for Grav adds the ability to create and use forms. Prior to 9.1.0 , there is an unauthenticated page-content overwrite via file upload (GHSA-w4rc-p66m-x6qq). Public form uploads now strip path components from the POST-supplied filename and hard-block page-content extensions (`md`, `yaml`, `yml`, `json`, `twig`, `ini`) regardless of the configurable dangerous-extensions list. A permissive `accept` policy combined with the default `destination: self@` could otherwise let an attacker overwrite the page's own `.md` and pivot to super-admin via a `process: save` action. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.1.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42845"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w4rc-p66m-x6qq</id>
    <title>GHSA-w4rc-p66m-x6qq — Grav Form Plugin has an Anonymous Page Content Overwrite via Form File Upload filename Override</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T07:04:23.978825+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: getgrav/grav-plugin-form</p>
<p>### Summary
(Tested on Form 9.0.3 released on April, 28th)</p>
<p>The Form plugin's file upload handler at `user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:583` accepts a POST-supplied `filename` parameter (`$filename = $post['filename'] ?? $upload['file']['name']`) that overrides the original uploaded filename. The override passes through `Utils::checkFilename()`, which blocks only a narrow extension list (`.php*`, `.htm*`, `.js`, `.exe`). Markdown (`.md`) is **not** blocked.</p>
<p>A page's directory under `user/pages/` contains its `.md` content file (e.g. `default.md`, `form.md`). When a form's file upload field has `accept: ['*']` (or any policy that admits text files), an unauthenticated visitor can:</p>
<p>1. Upload **arbitrary content** with **`filename=form.md`** (or other page-content filenames),
2. Submit the form to trigger `Form::copyFiles()`, which **overwrites the page's own `.md` file**.</p>
<p>### Details
**Vulnerable code path**</p>
<p>`user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:580-606` (in `uploadFiles()`):
```php
$grav-&gt;fireEvent('onFormUploadSettings', new Event(['settings' =&gt; &amp;$settings, 'post' =&gt; $post]));</p>
<p>$upload = json_decode(json_encode($this-&gt;normalizeFiles($_FILES['data'], $settings-&gt;name)), true);
$filename = $post['filename'] ?? $upload['file']['name'];           // ← POST-controlled
// ...
if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) {                              // ← extension blocklist only
    return ['status' =&gt; 'error', 'message' =&gt; 'Bad filename'];
}
```</p>
<p>`Utils::checkFilename()` (`system/src…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w4rc-p66m-x6qq"/>
  </entry>
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