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  <updated>2026-10-07T05:36:51.540276+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-324072</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-324072</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:36:51.542666+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-324072</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-324072"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42073</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-42073</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:36:51.542697+00:00</updated>
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        <p>OpenClaude is an open-source coding-agent command line interface for cloud and local model providers. Prior to version 0.5.1, the OpenClaude MCP authentication flow starts a temporary local HTTP server to handle OAuth callbacks. To prevent CSRF attacks, the server validates a state parameter against an internally stored value. However, due to a logic flaw in the order of conditionals, an attacker can completely bypass this check and force the server to shut down — without knowing the state value at all. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42073"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c73c-x77g-854r</id>
    <title>GHSA-c73c-x77g-854r — OpenClaude MCP OAuth Callback: State Check Bypass via error Param Leads to DoS</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T05:36:51.542733+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @gitlawb/openclaude</p>
<p># OAuth State Validation Bypass via `error` Parameter Causes Local Server DoS in MCP Auth Callback
---</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>The OpenClaude MCP authentication flow starts a temporary local HTTP server to handle OAuth callbacks. To prevent CSRF attacks, the server validates a `state` parameter against an internally stored value. However, due to a logic flaw in the order of conditionals, an attacker can completely bypass this check and force the server to shut down — without knowing the `state` value at all.</p>
<p>The vulnerable code looks like this:</p>
<p>```typescript
if (!error &amp;&amp; state !== oauthState) {
    rejectOnce(new Error('OAuth state mismatch - possible CSRF attack'))
    return
}</p>
<p>if (error) {
    cleanup()
    rejectOnce(new Error(errorMessage))
    return
}
```</p>
<p>When a request arrives with an `error` query parameter (e.g., `?error=anything`), the first condition becomes `false` because `!error` evaluates to `false`. This means the CSRF check is **never reached**. Execution falls through to the second block, where `cleanup()` is called — shutting down the local server and terminating the user's active authentication session.</p>
<p>The attacker does not need to know the `state` value. Any request containing an `error` parameter is enough to trigger the shutdown.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- The user's OAuth flow is silently terminated mid-session
- The local callback server is shut down (Denial of Service)
- Can be triggered remotely via a malicious web page using a cross-origin request (CSRF)…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c73c-x77g-854r"/>
  </entry>
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