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  <updated>2026-10-06T21:21:36.629900+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309298</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-309298</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T21:21:36.676333+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-309298</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309298"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41683</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-41683</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T21:21:36.676371+00:00</updated>
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        <p>i18next-http-middleware is a middleware to be used with Node.js web frameworks like express or Fastify and also for Deno. Prior to version 3.9.3, i18next-http-middleware wrote user-controlled language values into the Content-Language response header after passing them through utils.escape(), which is an HTML-entity encoder that does not strip carriage return, line feed, or other control characters. When the application used an older i18next (&lt; 19.5.0) that still exercised the backward-compatibility fallback at LanguageDetector.js:100 or otherwise produced a raw detected value, CRLF sequences in the attacker-controlled lng parameter reached res.setHeader('Content-Language', ...) verbatim. This issue has been patched in version 3.9.3.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41683"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c3h8-g69v-pjrg</id>
    <title>GHSA-c3h8-g69v-pjrg — i18next-http-middleware: HTTP response splitting and DoS via unsanitised Content-Language header</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T21:21:36.676411+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: i18next-http-middleware</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Versions of `i18next-http-middleware` prior to 3.9.3 wrote user-controlled language values into the `Content-Language` response header after passing them through `utils.escape()`, which is an HTML-entity encoder that does not strip carriage return, line feed, or other control characters. When the application used an older `i18next` (&lt; 19.5.0) that still exercised the backward-compatibility fallback at `LanguageDetector.js:100` or otherwise produced a raw detected value, CRLF sequences in the attacker-controlled `lng` parameter reached `res.setHeader('Content-Language', ...)` verbatim.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Two concrete outcomes depending on the Node.js version:</p>
<p>- **Node.js &lt; 14.6.0 — HTTP response splitting.** An attacker crafting a request like `GET /?lng=en%0d%0aX-Injected%3A+malicious` could inject arbitrary additional HTTP response headers, enabling:
  - Session fixation via an injected `Set-Cookie`
  - Cache poisoning (injecting `Location`, `Content-Type`, etc.)
  - Reflected XSS in controlled response bodies
- **Node.js ≥ 14.6.0 — denial of service.** `res.setHeader()` throws `ERR_INVALID_CHAR` when the value contains CRLF. Because the middleware did not catch this error, it propagated as an unhandled exception, returning a 500 response to **all concurrent users sharing that process** (in worker-pool deployments this can knock out a full server instance).</p>
<p>The same header-setting code path fires inside the `languageChanged` event listener and again in the main mid…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c3h8-g69v-pjrg"/>
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