https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-09T02:00:52.303969+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-293004 EUVD-2026-293004 2026-10-09T02:00:52.344397+00:00 EUVD-2026-293004 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41433 fkie_cve-2026-41433 2026-10-09T02:00:52.344457+00:00

OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation provides eBPF instrumentation based on the OpenTelemetry standard. From 0.4.0 to before 0.8.0, a flaw in the Java agent injection path allows a local attacker controlling a Java workload to overwrite arbitrary host files when Java injection is enabled and OBI is running with elevated privileges. The injector trusted TMPDIR from the target process and used unsafe file creation semantics, enabling both filesystem boundary escape and symlink-based file clobbering. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8gmg-3w2q-65f4 GHSA-8gmg-3w2q-65f4 — OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Privileged Java agent injection allows arbitrary host file overwrite via untrusted… 2026-10-09T02:00:52.344496+00:00

Affected: Go: go.opentelemetry.io/obi

### Summary

A flaw in the Java agent injection path allows a local attacker controlling a Java workload to overwrite arbitrary host files when Java injection is enabled and OBI is running with elevated privileges. The injector trusted `TMPDIR` from the target process and used unsafe file creation semantics, enabling both filesystem boundary escape and symlink-based file clobbering.

### Remediation

Upgrade to https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/releases/tag/v0.8.0.

### Details

The issue is in the Java agent staging logic in `pkg/internal/java/java_inject.go`.

The injector reads `TMPDIR` from the target process environment in `findTempDir(...)` and validates it with `dirOK(...)`. In the vulnerable implementation, `dirOK(...)` used `filepath.Join(root, dir)`, where `root` is `/proc/<pid>/root`. If `dir` is an absolute path, `filepath.Join` discards `root`, so values such as `/etc` or `/proc/1/root/etc` are resolved on the host instead of within the target process root.

That validated value is later reused in `copyAgent(...)` to build the destination path for the Java agent JAR. As a result, a malicious process can influence the privileged injector to write outside the intended `/proc/<pid>/root` boundary.

The file creation step further increases impact. The vulnerable code created the destination with `os.OpenFile(..., os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0o644)`. Because this does not use exclusive creation or symlink protections, an att…